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Expression and Extended Cognition
It is typically granted that musical works can ex-
press emotions independently of the occurrent
emotional states of their performers or composers.
Yet while the performer or composer need not ex-
press his or her emotional state, it is still a value
that may be effectively pursued, and for which
music is highly suitable. Moreover, I will argue for
the possibility of an extremely intimate connec-
tion between the emotional content of the music
and the emotional state of the person who pro-
duces that music. Under certain specified condi-
tions, the music may not just influence but also
partially constitute themusician’s emotional state.
In order to develop this idea I will need tomake
several significant assumptions concerning the re-
lation between music and emotions. First of all,
as is argued by several current theories of emo-
tion, I will assume that emotions are essentially
constituted by patterns of bodily changes. These
patterns of bodily changes are registered in the
brain, which then generates the felt experience of
the emotion.1
Second, I will assume a version of the resem-
blance theory of musical expression similar to that
offered byMalcolmBudd. This position is summa-
rized by the slogan “the music sounds the way the
emotion feels.” Via a variety of resources (such as
rhythm, timbre, melodic line), music is able to re-
semble thedynamic andvisceral qualities of bodily
feelings.2
A third assumption is that these resemblances
are tracked by the same mechanism in the brain
that registers bodily changes in emotions. In sup-
port of this claim, a connection has been made
between the perception of musical expression and
the empathic simulation of the emotions of oth-
ers.3 Yet these same empathic mechanisms are
the ones that are responsible for monitoring our
own bodily states.4 So the idea is that by resem-
bling emotional activity (both in terms of behav-
ioral movement and qualitative tension), music
can hijack the mechanisms in the brain that are
responsible for tracking both our own emotions
and the emotions of others. As a result, when we
listen tomusic we seem to perceive emotion in the
music.5
Clearly, these are rather large assumptions, for
which I provide proper justification elsewhere.6
However, they will allow us to develop some very
interesting possibilities. In particular they will al-
low us to argue that music can potentially play
the same role as bodily changes in realizing the
musician’s emotional state.
The claim that music can partially constitute a
musician’s emotion also requires that themusician
can control the content of the music in a very im-
mediate and detailed way. Allowing for this level
of control leads me to focus on jazz improvisa-
tion, which in many cases is dedicated to the goal
of sincere emotional expression. I then explore the
idea, common to the works of Benedetto Croce,
R.G.Collingwood, and JohnDewey, that the artist
clarifies and develops his emotional state by ex-
pressing it. Here I emphasize the essential role
of the artistic medium (in this case the musical
instrument or the sounds produced) to that pro-
cess. This then leads me to the theory of extended
cognition, which argues that the physical consti-
tution of some mental states extends beyond the
brain of the subject. After showing how this the-
ory applies to improvised performance, I then jus-
tify two claims: First, that playing the instrument
cognitively extends the musician’s creation of the
music. Then second, and more significantly, that
playing the music cognitively extends the musi-
cian’s emotion.
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The first claim is argued to be true of all cases
of jazz improvisation. The second claim is only
true of a subset of cases, yet seems to be an im-
portant goal of jazz performance. Given this, the
second claim then breaks down into a stronger and
a weaker version. The weaker version states that
themusic elaborates the emotional state of themu-
sician, playing the same role as his or her bodily
changes in generating andmaintaining the pattern
of bodily changes. The stronger version is that the
music replaces the role of bodily changes as the
central focus in generating emotional content.
Note that in neither case do I identify the emo-
tion with the conscious experience of the emo-
tion. Several theorists argue for the possibility of
unconscious emotions.7 So my claim here is only
that the emotion is partially constituted by the
music, not the experience of the emotion. How-
ever, we may say that in these situations, the mu-
sician’s experience of the music can to a greater
or lesser degree fulfill his or her experience of the
emotion.
i. the musician’s emotion
One problem with the idea that works of music
gain their emotional content from the emotions of
their composers is explaining how it is that feeling
a certain way while producing a work is supposed
to convey these characteristics to the work itself.
Even in the more direct case of performance, it
is not the case that the emotion of the musician
is necessarily transmitted to the work. In order
to explicate this, it is worth distinguishing several
levels at which the emotional state of themusician
may affect the character of the music.
First of all, themusicianmay be in an emotional
state prior to performance. Performing while in
that state then affects the character of the music.
For instance, being anxious causes the musician
to make mistakes. A second possibility is that the
emotional state of themusician affects themusic in
such a way that the character of the emotion is re-
flected in the character of the music. For instance,
the musician feels anxious, and playing the music
in an anxious way causes the music to have an
anxious character (perhaps a tremor in the hands
leads to a tremor in the sound). A third possibil-
ity is that the musician is in a relatively neutral
state prior to performance but is fully aroused by
the character of the music he is playing. It may
then follow that being infected by the character of
the music affects the way the musician plays that
music. Finally, a fourth possibility further allows
that this changed performance style transmits the
quality of the musician’s emotion back to the mu-
sic. Hence a feedback loop could be generated
whereby the music arouses the state of the mu-
sician, affecting the way he performs, which then
affects the character of the music, potentially fur-
ther arousing the musician and so on.
In all cases, we should note that the emotion
of the musician need not enhance the expressive
value of the music. There is a difference between
a musician’s aroused state affecting the perfor-
mance and themusician using that arousal in a de-
liberate and controlled way to enhance the perfor-
mance. Different styles of music permit different
ways in which this can happen. In particular, jazz
emphasizes spontaneity and communication over
technical accuracy. As such, this genre should per-
mit greater levels of emotional arousal in the play-
ers and amore immediate connection between the
state of the musician and the nature of the work.
There are still limits of course. Jazz improvisation
is not the pure spontaneous production of music
that it is sometimes taken to be. In most cases
there is some kind of preplanned reference ma-
terial such as a written chord structure, melodic
theme, or background tonality that the musician
uses to guide his performance.
For now I take as my paradigm a relatively un-
constrained solo improvisation style that, while
sticking to the stylistic forms of the jazz genre, im-
poses no time constraints or adherence to a par-
ticular chord structure. This should be of ample
sufficiency to let the performer’s emotion signifi-
cantly affect the character of the music (in details
both large and small) such that it corresponds to
the character of his feeling. It is thus closer to
modal or free jazz than bebop. I am not reliant
on this specific kind of improvisational style or
even on the jazz genre generally in order to justify
my claims. It is likely that other forms of impro-
visational music may equally permit the kinds of
expressive potential I argue for here. Yet I restrict
my attention to jazz improvisation, partly due
to my familiarity with this genre as a performer
and listener, and partly because historically it
has emphasized the personal expression of the
musician.8
This is not to say that musicians simply regur-
gitate whatever they happen to be feeling at that
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exact moment in musical form. If this was all there
was to it, they could just as easily shout or groan
with the same expressive success. Rather it is also
possible for musicians to use the music to self-
reflectively construct their feelings, to control and
transform their felt states into something more
artistically profound. The expression theories of
Croce and Collingwood are well known for devel-
oping ideas like this. We often see the claim that
art is geared toward revealing the emotional state
of the artist. In certain passages we even see the
stronger claim that the artist does not simply dis-
cover her emotional state by expressing it, but also
that expression is crucial to forming that state.
[The painting] is produced by an activity which is some-
how or other bound up with the development of that
[aesthetic] experience itself. The two activities are not
identical; he distinguishes them by the names “painting”
and “seeing” respectively; but they are connected in such
a way that, he assures us, each is conditional upon the
other. . . . There is no question of “externalizing” an in-
ward experience which is complete in itself and by itself.
There are two experiences, an inward or imaginative one
called seeing and an outward or bodily one called paint-
ing, which in the painter’s life are inseparable, and form
one single indivisible experience, an experience which
may be described as painting imaginatively.9
Here Collingwood emphasizes that the act of
painting and the aesthetic experience are not iden-
tical, but are so closely related that they are expe-
rienced as if they were indivisible. The two pro-
cesses are interdependent, at least in certain cases.
This suggests then that the act of expression en-
ables the formation of the emotional state.Wealso
see this view in Dewey, who explicitly rejects the
idea that what is expressed is just an externaliza-
tion of a preexisting emotional state. Rather it is
physical interaction with a resistant medium that
allows the emotion to be formed:
The thing expressed is wrung from the producer by the
pressure exercised by objective things upon the natural
impulses and tendencies—so far is expression from being
the direct and immaculate issue of the latter. The third
point follows. The act of expression that constitutes a
workof art is a construction in time, not an instantaneous
emission. . . . It means that the expression of the self in
and through a medium, constituting the work of art is
itself a prolonged interaction of something issuing from
the self with objective conditions, a process in which
both of them acquire a form and order they did not at
first possess. (emphasis added)10
I will largely leave aside here the debate about
whether Croce or Collingwood were idealists
about artistic expression.11 I would simply like to
note the vital connection between the sort of ex-
pression that is suggested by the above passages
and the actual physical production of the artwork.
In general we should endorse the view that emo-
tional expression in art is bound with its physi-
cal means of production. As Richard Wollheim
argues, the difficulties (and unpredictability) that
accompany the handling of the physical medium
are often a vital part of what makes the work ex-
pressive.12 Moreover, any ideas that the artist has
prior to producing the object are ideas about how
the medium may be manipulated. They are ideas
of the medium and presuppose its actual phys-
ical characteristics. So, for instance, when a jazz
musician expresses her emotional state in perfor-
mance, shemust think of that emotion in distinctly
musical terms. It is the qualities and relations ob-
tained by the actual physical sounds (sometimes
accidentally) that constitute her emotional lan-
guage. Similarly, Aaron Ridley claims that “the
peculiar fluidity and grace and power of Bernini’s
Ecstasy of St. Theresa are inseparable from the fact
that it has been almost caressed out of a piece of
stone.”13 Comparable arguments could be gener-
ated for musical performances where the stretch-
ing of a particular musical instrument’s capacities
is part of what it is for that music to express an
emotion such as boundless joy.
Moreover, artworks like improvised jazz per-
formances are much more tied to their actual sin-
gular occurrence than notational art forms like
poetry or scored music. The improviser does not
get a second chance to replace what she has al-
ready played with something more appropriate.
Rather, the whole performance may be viewed
as the struggle of the musician to articulate her
state, forming and reacting against the unalter-
able characteristics of that very event. This is what
makes the performance her expression in a way
that the rest of us can only appreciate rather than
replicate. And ultimately it is the deep individu-
ality of this kind of expression that really under-
mines any claim to idealism, at least so far as these
kinds of artworks are concerned. This is because
what guarantees that a work captures an individ-
ual emotional state is the unique physicality of its
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expression, the fact that it is embodied in a par-
ticular physical event by a particular person in a
particular set of circumstances.
The main reason I think Croce and Colling-
wood come across as idealists is because their
concern is to say the real work of art is a kind
of mental state or process. Under most interpreta-
tions of mind this would automatically imply that
the public object could not be the real work of art,
and so conflictwith our basic intuitions aboutwhat
artworks are. Yet I think we can rescue as well as
strengthen some (though not all) of the insights of
their position when we appeal to the theory of ex-
tended cognition. As we shall see, it is possible for
the physical production of an artwork to be inte-
grated with a cognitive process such that it is part
of the artist’s mental state. As a result, we can hold
on to our intuitions that physical objects and their
actual history of production are what constitute
artworks while still embracing the possibility that
artists are focused on articulating mental states.
ii. extended cognition
In order to explain how extended cognition ap-
plies to jazz improvisation it is necessary to pro-
vide some background on the theory. Its locus
classicus is Andy Clark and David Chalmers’s
influential paper “The Extended Mind” (though
they are indebted to externalist theories of mind
generally).14 Their basic idea is that we often in-
corporate external objects into our cognitive pro-
cesses, the active manipulation of which enables
the completion of various cognitive tasks. So, for
example, if I do some long division step-by-step on
a piece of paper or if I rearrange Scrabble tiles in
order to find a word to play, I am exploiting these
information-rich features of the environment to
support and supplement my cognitive processes.
Hence they argue that these kinds of action are
“epistemically active” in that they alter the world
for the purpose of completing some cognitive task
rather than simply to enact some preconceived
change that the subject intends.
It seems that many of our behaviors can be
interpreted in this light where the environmen-
tal resource is reliable and easily available and
the subject automatically endorses the informa-
tion it provides. A key part of arguments for ex-
tended cognition (and externalist views of mind
generally) then involves a supervenience claim: If
two identical cognitive processes or states inter-
nal to the body can nevertheless have different
content due to differences external to the body,
then the constitution of the mental state must par-
tially supervene on those relevant aspects of the
environment.
So, for instance, if the Scrabble tiles happened
to have been arranged differently, I would have
come up with a different word despite being in
the same internal “search” state. Obviously, this
difference would then have impacted upon my
brain state when I recognized the word to play.
The point is, however, that within a certain range, I
would endorsewhateverword the external process
resulted in.My internal state, though an important
source of control in choosing theword, is not doing
all the relevant work in finding that word. Work
is being done by objects outside my body, which
in combination with my actions and brain state
physically realize an extended cognitive system.
As a final test we may ask whether if the same
process were done purely in the head (say imagi-
natively moving Scrabble tiles around), we would
be happy to grant it cognitive status. If we would,
then it seems to exclude the object as part of the
cognitive process simply because it is located out-
side the body is nothing more than a conceptual
prejudice.
Clark andChalmers goon to argue that not only
can processes like recognition be cognitively ex-
tended but also more definitive mental states such
as beliefs. Here they use the example of Otto, who
has Alzheimer’s disease and who uses a notebook
to tell him the location of the museum. The note-
book then functions as a part of Otto’s long-term
memory, which coupled with Otto’s disposition
to consult the notebook when considering the lo-
cation of the museum, forms his belief that the
museum is on 53rd Street.15
We might worry that because Otto has to per-
ceive visually the notebook in order to consciously
hold his belief, it is quite unlike the direct and
subpersonal activity of accessing such informa-
tion fromourbiologicalmemories, especially since
the visual image has a distinctive phenomenology.
However Clark and Chalmers argue that because
the flow of information from notebook to brain
is all part of the same cognitive system, it is not
perceptual at all in the sense of “registering the im-
pact of something outside the system.”16 Further-
more, the phenomenology of retrieving the infor-
mation is not particularly relevant to its status as
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a belief. We could equally suppose that if a sound
accompanied the introspective access of our bio-
logical memories, those memories would no less
form a part of our beliefs. Moreover, Otto’s be-
lief is not constituted by an internal mental rep-
resentation of the page in his notebook or the
disposition to form such a representation. Rather
it is the active exploitation of the information the
notebook provides (that happens to be visually
received) with additional internal processes (such
as the subject’s endorsement) that together com-
plete a system realizing the cognitive function.
So there is a general sense of representation
that is distinct from the acquisition of internal
representational states.17 Otto’s extended system
functions as a whole to represent where the mu-
seum is. Note that if we were to secretly change
what is written in Otto’s notebook, he would ef-
fectively gain a new belief state (because he al-
ways endorses what it says in the notebook). Since
this external feature alone determines a different
mental state, in accordance with supervenience
we must identify that feature as partially realiz-
ing his mental state. Moreover, these differences
would not necessarily have to impact on Otto’s
internal brain state to do all the work that beliefs
do. For instance, someone could ask Otto where
the museum is, and he could simply show her the
relevant page in his notebook, without having to
look at it himself and say, “That is where I think
it is.”
iii. jazz improvisation as extended cognition
Having briefly explained the theory of extended
cognition, we may now begin to see how it applies
to the case of jazz improvisation. My overall strat-
egy here is to show how the improvising jazz mu-
sician can go through a process of emotional ex-
pressionmuch as Croce, Collingwood, andDewey
described, while emphasizing that this act of ex-
pression is realized by the physical interaction be-
tween themusician, his instrument, and themusic.
So forming the emotion by expressing it in music
is a cognitively extended process. Before we deal
with emotional expression, however, it is neces-
sary to first show how the musician can develop
such a close relationship with the music. This is
my first claim, that playing the instrument cogni-
tively extends themusician’s creation of themusic.
Hence I begin with a universal claim that simply
improvising, apart from any concerns about hav-
ing a real emotion, is a formof extended cognition.
It is this view that music psychologist Eric Clarke
seems to be endorsing when he says that “playing
music is a concrete form of musical thinking, and
the body is as much a part of finding out about
music as it is a means for its actualization.”18
If we consider the simple task of generating
notes, it is clear that the musician’s interaction
with his instrument allows him to do this, not just
in the uninteresting sense that the musician needs
the instrument to producenotes at all, but also that
the particular way in which the notes are formed
is a matter of sensitively responding to the capaci-
ties and affordances of the physical object. It is not
the case that the musician always has some music
in mind (either as sound or in symbolic form) that
he just enacts on the instrument. Moreover, even
if the performer does have a rough idea of what
sound he wants to produce, there are many fea-
tures of that sound that go beyond his concept of
it, yet which he would still endorse as the sound
he wanted to play.
At every level of creative decisions themusician
and his instrument form a single tightly coupled
system. For example, certain qualitative features
of the sound may just be a product of the way
the instrument is set up. It might have a harsh or
smooth tone, for instance. So the instrument itself
helps to decide the character of each note that the
musician then endorses. The way the instrument
is physically set up also constrains and encour-
ages ways that notes can be strung together. Some
musical figures will fall more naturally under the
musician’s fingers, particularly when he is playing
very fast. In addition, building up a vocabulary
of musical figures is something done on the in-
strument by exploring its physical capacities. This
development then allows the expansion of themu-
sician’s imaginative capacities in terms of what is
possible to play.
In addition, within the immediate context of
performance there is the sense in which the musi-
cian may only have a rough idea of what he wants
to play, for instance a fast upwards sequence of
notes, but it is the interaction of his fingerswith the
keys that ultimately determines what exact notes
are played. Thus when completing the cognitive
task of choosing what exact notes to play, the in-
strument is part of an extended loop between the
musician’s brain, the muscles in his hands or lips,
and the keys of the instrument. As in the Scrabble
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example,within a certain range, themusician auto-
matically endorses whatever the external physical
processes result in.
There is then a further level at which the
musician’s conscious interaction with the music
determines what he will play next. Similar to the
instrument, the music itself will present certain
limitations and affordances to the musician in
terms of what sounds could follow in a musically
coherent or meaningful way. I call this a sense
of the music’s potential. It is an experience of the
music’s temporal development, which to the expe-
rienced listener suggests constraints at every mo-
ment concerning how themusic canprogress given
what has already happened. Thus music can gain
potential in terms of building harmonic tension
that can be resolved by returning to the home key,
or in terms of developing a theme before eventual
recapitulation, as well as in terms of maintaining
tempo, rhythmic pulse, and note durations, as well
as developing general dynamic shapes like build-
ing to a climax or fading away. We should note
that the musician must perceive these qualities in
order to react to them, and their perception re-
lies on certain standards he has acquired concern-
ing harmonic or rhythmic development. Yet at the
same time themusicianmay not have planned any
of these qualities. They may simply be the unex-
pected consequences of other musical decisions
he has made.
Many features of the expressive character of the
music can equally be unplanned and can gener-
ate their own form of potential, in terms of main-
taining an emotional character or developing it to
completion or exhaustion. The resemblance the-
ory of musical expression allows that the expres-
sive character of the music be conveyed by fea-
tures at every level of detail, from the intensity
with which individual notes are attacked to the
smoothness of the timbre, the rhythmic pulse, and
harmonic tension as well as the large-scale formal
structure. It is thus highly unlikely that the musi-
cian can anticipate and control all of these poten-
tial sources of expressive effect. In many cases he
can only react to the precise expressive character
themusic suggests. Yet he can still intelligibly take
responsibility for the exact expressive qualities of
the sound.Though themusic possesses awide vari-
ety of subtle expressive qualities that the musician
did not plan or predict, he can, like Otto and his
notebook, still point to the music and endorse the
expression of that.
So overall, these features of the music form
an information-rich environment that the musi-
cian relies on when deciding what will happen
next. In this way the music and musician form
a cognitively extended system where the music
presents certain information about what sounds
are available, which combines with the musician’s
endorsement of these possibilities to enable and
enhance the cognitive task of generating musical
sounds. The musician’s endorsement of these pos-
sibilities relies on his musical intentions. So a di-
alogue is set up between his intentions and his
sense of musical potential. The key difference be-
tween the two is that a musical intention is an
idea that the musician has about how the music
should sound in the future. The musical poten-
tial, in contrast, is an idea about how the music
will sound in the future so long as it is not dis-
rupted either by mistakes or contrary intentions.
Also, where musical potential is something actu-
ally heard and anticipated, musical intentions are
imaginative and creative. So a central component
in the experience of performing music concerns
the relative alignment of musical intentions with
musical potential. In the usual case the performer
experiences a tension between his idea of what the
music should sound like (perhaps determined by
some mood he is trying to capture, or some struc-
tural concept he has) and what possibilities the
sound itself seems to suggest or allow. A musician
can also choose to violate what he regards as the
musical potential for expressive effect. He could,
for instance, suddenly play louder in a melody
that is fading into silence, breaking an intuitive
constraint.19
Altogether then my claim that playing the in-
strument cognitively extends the musician’s cre-
ation of the music works at three levels, some
or all of which are present in all improvised per-
formances: The physical interaction between the
musician and the instrument achieves the task of
generating the detailed notes. The interaction be-
tween the musician’s intentions and the perceived
potential of the music determines the larger scale
shape and style of the music. Finally, the inter-
action between the musician’s intentions and per-
ceived emotional potential determines the expres-
sive character of the music, affecting the sound
at all levels of detail. All of this is analogous to
performing long division step-by-step on a piece
of paper or rearranging Scrabble tiles in order to
find a word to play.
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iv. emotion generation as extended cognition
Having justified my claim that creating the music
is cognitively extended, we can now turn to my
second claim: that the musician may use the music
to cognitively extend the formation of his or her
emotions. My explanation of how this is done can
be derived from the case of ordinary emotional
expression.
If we assume that bodily changes are what con-
stitute emotional states, we must equally include
behavioral expressions such as posture, bodily ges-
tures, and facial and vocal expressions.20 All of
these behaviors will contribute to the overall pat-
tern of bodily changes and thus to the felt ex-
perience of the emotion. As a result, the sub-
ject can to some extent take direct control of
her emotional state by deliberately manipulat-
ing her expressive behaviors. Psychologist James
Laird has reviewed over a hundred empirical
studies that have verified a causal link between
such manipulation and both self-reported and
measured levels of emotional arousal.21 For ex-
ample, most relevant to my claims, subjects in-
structed to speak in loud, harsh tones report
consequent feelings of anger whereas those in-
structed to speak in low, soft tones report more
sadness.22
In many cases, experimenters disguise the goals
of the study in order to ensure that the induced
feelings are not the result of the desire of the par-
ticipant to comply with the experimenter. So be-
cause the participants are not aware that their ex-
pressions are manipulating their emotions, these
expressions constitute in Collingwood’s terms a
mere betrayal of emotion rather than emotional
expression properly so called. However, Laird
claims that the robustness of the effect makes de-
ception on the part of the experimenter unneces-
sary. Accordingly, in another experiment partici-
pants were instructed simply to “please smile in
the way you usually do,” resulting in changes in
emotional arousal despite the participants’ disbe-
lief in the effectiveness of such behavior.23 This
kind of deliberate expressive behavior would bet-
ter fit Collingwood’s account.
The point that Croce, Collingwood, and Dewey
make is that we reveal or even generate the emo-
tion by artistic expression. When we emphasize
that expressive behaviors count as bodily changes
and are thus partly constitutive of the emotion,
we can see how the deliberate manipulation of
expressive behaviors can similarly serve to both
reveal and generate the emotion in a direct way.
It is, in fact, quite commonplace to adjust one’s
emotional behavior, and in doing so attempt to
adjust one’s emotional state. For example, when
one is nervous, perhaps when walking to the lec-
ture hall to deliver a paper, one may deliber-
ately adjust one’s posture and walking speed to
be more upright and sure-footed. One could al-
ternatively “embrace” the nerves by bounding up
to the podium as energetically as possible. Such
activities may bemore or less effective but are cer-
tainly plausible given the classic Jamesian notion
that “we feel sorry because we cry, angry because
we strike.”24
So instead of allowing oneself to be over-
come with rage, deliberate expressive behavior
can channel or focus that feelingwith a highly con-
trolled activity, which generates a sense of power
or regularity. Alternatively, one may try to relax
one’s muscles, move around gently, or speak more
slowly and quietly, generating a sense of calm.
We should also note that not all appropriate emo-
tional responses involve some kind of immediate
modification of one’s situation.Many involve con-
templation of the emotional state and the strug-
gle to accommodate it within one’s life projects.
We may ask ourselves, is this emotion rational or
beneficial to my goals? Should I therefore try to
sublimate it or allow it to blossom? Expressive
behavior is a way in which we can ask ourselves
these questions. By directly modifying the bod-
ily pattern and monitoring the results, we can ex-
periment with the emotional state, adjusting one’s
feeling as seems appropriate. Thus, expression can
allow a more sensitive response to one’s situation.
In this way, the subject can effectively use her
behavioral expression to directly “think through”
her emotional state.
Now by suggesting that expressive behavior al-
lows one to “think through” one’s emotion, the
sense of cognition that I appeal to here is that
it is a process in which one actively manipulates
mental states, rather than anything that essentially
involves concepts.25 This sense of cognition is com-
patible with an entirely somatic theory of emo-
tions, since, although we are generally the passive
recipients of our emotional states, it is possible
for us to actively manipulate our pattern of bod-
ily changes, or more directly the neural model of
such changes. This is what I suggest can occur in
the case of improvisation.
336 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
When it comes to music then, the basic argu-
ment is that an improvised performance can par-
tially constitute an emotional state because the
music can fulfill the same role for the musician as
the behavioral expression of emotion. The way it
feels to cry or shout or jump for joy is a distinctive
part of what it feels like to be sad, angry, or joyful.
In the sameway, it feels like something to produce
sounds on an instrument. To strike or blow the
notes gently or aggressively directly arouses the
corresponding bodily feeling. More importantly
though, the resemblance betweenmusic and emo-
tion potentially allows the musician to identify
the sounds she produces as part of her emotional
feeling. This is because the resemblance theory I
have adopted states that the patterns in the mu-
sic are mapped by the musician’s brain as if they
were patterns of emotional feeling, causing her
to hear emotion in the music. The brain of the
musician treats the patterns in the music equiva-
lently topatterns of bodily changes. So if thebodily
changes are part of the emotion,might not themu-
sical changes be functionally equivalent and thus
equally part of the emotion?
One objection may be that if the map of bod-
ily changes in the brain is not supported by ac-
tual bodily changes, the resulting state is not a real
emotional state. But here the relation between the
neural maps involved in emotions and the bodily
changes that they map should be clarified. Anto-
nio Damasio describes how the neural map may
serve in everyday emotional episodes to antici-
pate actual bodily changes.26 This allows a more
immediate emotional experience and behavioral
response to beorganized.Hence themere fact that
the brain is not mapping actual bodily changes
need not be a barrier to the authenticity of the
emotion.
Yet while the neural map of changes is suffi-
cient for feeling, we still include the various bodily
changes as part of the emotional state when they
do occur. This is because the kind of emotional ex-
perience that the neural map generates is likely to
be highly attenuated where it is not supported by
constant bodily changes. In general, the various
bodily changes are what generate and maintain
the content of the emotion, where the neural map
merely registers that content. The neural map is
like the manager of a company, where the work
done by the company as a whole is what consti-
tutes the mental state. Certainly the neural map is
a very important stage in the system where vari-
ous content converges. This is an important step
before going on to interpret that content, direct
the attention of the subject, stimulate behaviors,
and connect to other mental states. Yet the bod-
ily changes are doing a lot of the work for that
emotional state.
Damasio also identifies the same neural map
at work in the recognition of other people’s emo-
tional states. As such, what distinguishes whether
the neural map helps to realize a real emotion
or an empathic state is not whether it tracks real
or simulated bodily changes, but whether the sys-
tem as a whole is triggered by a situation bearing
on the well-being of the subject or the expressed
state of another (or even a fictional expression of
emotion). In the case of the improvising musician,
there is no reason that the feelings expressed by
the music cannot track the real situation of the
musician. The musician can produce those sounds
as a direct result of confronting some situation.
The music could even be both the object of an
emotional state (for instance, howwell one is play-
ing) and self-reflectively the emotional response
to that object. Yet there is no reason why the mu-
sician cannot also be responding to some other
aspect of the environment, such as the audience
reaction, or any thought or imaginative idea she
might have at the same time.
A second reason we can identify the musical
patterns as part of the musician’s emotion con-
cerns the control that the subject has over the
emotion-generating process, which determines
whether the state is partly cognitive or a purely
passive reaction. Since the musician is responsible
for producing and endorsing the emotional con-
tent of the music, this entails that the musician is
cognitively deliberating her emotional reaction, in
the same way as deliberately engaging in expres-
sive actions allows the cognition of emotions. The
sense of control or agency over the emotional con-
tent of the music encourages a conscious identifi-
cation with its content, unlike the case of simply
listening to expressive music, where the listener
must submit to its flow.
v. the relation between musical
and bodily changes
So what of the actual bodily changes of the mu-
sician in this case? In the first place, the bodily
changes of themusician help to generate the inten-
tions of the musician to appropriately match the
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way he feels in the music. The musician’s sensitiv-
ity to the expressive qualities of themusic can also
arouse his bodily changes in turn, as I described
earlier. Thus a dialogue can be set up between the
musical potential in emotional terms and the inner
bodily changes of the musician.
Consider then how the musician starts his im-
provisation: He could just wait beside his instru-
ment and contemplate his emotional feelings be-
fore launching into a solo that he feels reflects
these feelings, or as seems more likely, he will just
start playing in a very impulsive way and then al-
low his sensitivity to the music to develop into a
sense of emotion. Either way, there is a constant
feedback between the musician’s inner changes
and the expressive character he perceives in the
music.
However, if this was all there was to it, wemight
complain that the inner bodily changes of the mu-
sician already constitute his emotional state. The
music merely influences that state, or is influenced
by the state in turn. Sowhilewe could admit a close
relation between the two, we need not say that
the music partially constitutes the musician’s emo-
tion.27 Yet this criticism can be met on two levels:
First of all, by tracking the music with his aroused
bodily changes and then reacting to maintain or
develop the unplanned emotional character of the
sound, the musician is endorsing whatever emo-
tional content the music suggests. The music has
direct control over what the content of the emo-
tional state is. This is analogous to endorsingwhat-
ever it says in the notebook. Sowhere we conceive
of the emotion as a cognitive process of deciding
what to feel, the music itself plays a vital role in
enabling and enhancing this process.
Note that in the case I describe the musician
cannot manipulate his emotional state directly.
He can only send a signal from the brain, to his
hands, to the instrument, to the music, which he
then hears and interprets as feelings. So he simply
cannot cognize his emotion without actually ma-
nipulating the music. Suppose the musician had
an identical twin whose brain is in a vat, so with
exactly the same brain state, sending out exactly
the same signals, and receiving exactly the same
felt feedback. Yet in this case the music is absent
or changes in the music are independent of his
instructions. This twin would be undergoing a dif-
ferent mental state. The twin subject would not be
cognizing his emotion. He would be having a pas-
sive emotional reaction, since he would not be in
control of manipulating his emotional representa-
tions at all. His feelings would be occurring quite
independently of his attempt to control them. So
given that changes in the music alone entail a dif-
ferent sort of mental state, the music must be a
physical part of the cognition of feeling.
However, we may draw a distinction between
decidingwhat emotion to have and the emotion it-
self, just as we may draw a distinction between de-
ciding to perform an action and the bodily changes
that this action generates. So second, it is impor-
tant to note that the music is also immediately
incorporated into the musician’s emotion via his
neural map. That is, the musician enjoys the feel-
ings expressed by the music alongside his internal
bodily changes as the total combined emotional
state. The patterns in the music effectively play
the same role as his inner bodily changes in relat-
ing to the overall bodily pattern. I argued above
that bodily changes should be included as a con-
stitutive part of the emotional system. This was
partly because they do vital work in generating
andmaintaining the emotional content. Themusi-
cal patterns equally do significantwork in generat-
ing and maintaining the emotional content where
the musician’s brain simply endorses that content.
So equally we should include themusic as a consti-
tutive part of the emotion. The music constitutes
part of the content that is registered in forming the
overall representational state.
In this case themusic constitutes a physical elab-
oration of the musician’s felt state. Phenomenally
the musician partially experiences his emotional
state in musical form. Of course, the qualities of
the music are then registered by the musician’s
brain. Yet actual bodily changes are equally reg-
istered by the musician’s brain. In either case the
emotion is physically constituted by the system
that incorporates both the neural map and the
bodily or musical changes that sustain it. Then in
the case I have been describing, there is interac-
tion between all these parts. So we may say that
the emotion is constituted by the entire system
of bodily map in the brain, bodily changes, bod-
ily actions, the activity of the instrument, and the
patterns in the music. The vehicle of brain, body,
instrument, and music then supports this system
for generating the content of the emotion.
In general, one of the main motivations for
including an external object as part of a cogni-
tive process is that it should enhance that cog-
nitive process, and not merely enact the results
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of some internal process. In this case, when the
music is used to extend emotional cognition, it en-
hances the complexity of the emotion themusician
undergoes. Expressive actions can generate pat-
terns more fine grained than inner bodily changes.
Equallymusical expressions can generate patterns
far more fine grained than expressive actions. The
musical expression of emotion can have increased
complexity, temporal range, subtlety, and force. It
can also have long-term structural content as a
result of the repetition and development of mo-
tifs. As such, the music enhances the emotional
response of the musician. His emotional response
to the world can be that much more structured,
subtle, or intense.
vi. music as the core of emotion
So far, I have justified a weaker version of my
claim that the music partially constitutes the emo-
tional state of the performer. The core of the emo-
tional state is still the internal bodily changes of
the musician, which the music then elaborates.
However, there are some cases in which the mu-
sic appears to replace the bodily changes of the
subject as the main focus of the emotional state.
These are cases of radical absorption within the
emotional progression of the music.
Earlier I described a dialogue between the in-
tentions of the musician and the potential per-
ceived in themusic. Inmost cases, the intentions of
the musician are not perfectly realized. So where
the intentions and potential are experienced in
emotional terms, the musician may feel a tension
between her bodily feeling and the music’s ex-
pressive content (this would amount to a mixed
feeling). Yet it is possible for the musician’s inten-
tions to align with the emotional potential of the
music in such a way that the intentions of the mu-
sician effectively disappear. Alignment may occur
either because the musician finds that her emo-
tional intentions are immediately realized in mu-
sic or because she gives up trying to control the
music and simply affirms the progression of the
music as it happens. This kind of alignment is rare,
though claims that musicians themselves make
provide some evidence that this does take place.
Note that the following descriptions are clearly
impressionistic and suggestive rather than conclu-
sive demonstrations of my claims. Yet they seem
best explained by the theoretical apparatus I have
suggested:
I feel that I’m at my best when I can free myself com-
pletely from the effort of trying to put something out
and feel more like I am the instrument being played.28
Similarly:
If a solo is going well, developing, I let it go on its own.
Then I’ve reached that place where I’ve gotten out of my
own way, and it’s as if I’m standing back and watching
the solo play itself.29
Again:
I dance with it. That’s my emotional state when I play.
That’s my feeling of expressing my total self in the
music.30
In many ways, these experiences seem to rep-
resent one of the peaks of musical achievement.
This is because while it is not so hard to play the
note one intends to play a fraction of a second
earlier, especially if one has modest ambitions, it
is extremely difficult to temporally align one’s in-
tentions with the moment of actually producing
them, or to suspend one’s critical judgment of
what one is playing. When this does happen we
may say that the perception of the music fully ab-
sorbs the attention of the musician. So the music
takes the lead, or becomes the locus of control
for how the emotion of the musician will progress
(though, of course, in performing that music, the
musician overall is still in control).
Yet if the musician “loses” herself in the music,
such that she is no longer aware of her internal
feelings, what allows us to say that the musician
is feeling any emotion at all? Is the experience
of “watching the solo play itself” a form of self-
alienation? Ciara´n Benson, finding precedence
in Dewey’s descriptions of “a rhythm of surren-
der and reflection” in aesthetic activity, describes
these states of absorption as a “re-centering” of
experience.31 She diagnoses the phenomenon as
the absence of self-predicated thoughts. When
self-analysis disappears and the musician is more
absorbed in themusic, she does not feel embodied
in the same way. My theory justifies the idea that
the normal boundary of body-world has actually
changed. But the musician has not “lost” herself;
she has literally extended herself. It is not unrea-
sonable then that this should result in a different
sense of agency and embodiment.
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Yet is it still an emotional state? It would seem
so, since the case of musical absorption need be
no different from any case of normal emotional
absorptionwhere one is so caught up in the feeling
that one forgets oneself in the process. Moreover,
there is no reason to suppose that if the progress
of the music has up to this point been dictated by
the goal of emotional expression, then the music
suddenly loses its expressive status just because
the attention of the musician is now more fully
focused on the music.
Hence, overall, it seems that themusic justmore
fully constitutes and dominates the development
of the musician’s emotion. And although the at-
tention of the subject is not a necessary part of the
emotional state, wemay say that themusician’s ex-
perience of the music more fully constitutes his or
her experience of the emotion. At the same time,
we should recognize that being absorbed to such
an extent is a fairly exceptional state of being. So
emotionally it is likely to be a state of great eupho-
ria, where the dynamic relationwith theworld that
it tracks is a sense of one’s life flowing like music,
of living musically.32
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